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AN ADMINISTRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE:
THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Kevin M. Stack*
This Essay offers a speciﬁcation of the rule of law’s demands of
administrative law and government inspired by Professor Peter L.
Strauss’s scholarship. It identiﬁes ﬁve principles—authorization, notice,
justiﬁcation, coherence, and procedural fairness—which provide a
framework for an account of the rule of law’s demands of administrative
governance. Together these principles have intriguing results for the evaluation of administrative law. On the one hand, they reveal rule-of-law
foundations for some contested positions, such as a restrictive view of the
President’s power to direct subordinate ofﬁcials and giving weight to an
agency’s determination of the scope of its own authority. On the other
hand, these rule-of-law principles expose some long-established practices as
having troublesome foundations, such as the settled doctrine that agencies
need not justify their choice of policymaking form. Consideration of these
principles in the context of administrative law and government ultimately
shows—like so much of Professor Strauss’s work—the many ways in
which government under law ultimately depends on ofﬁcials taking the
rule of law as their highest-order commitment.
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INTRODUCTION
The rule of law, like democracy, is one of our most basic political
commitments.1 While the rule of law is an old ideal,2 interest in it has
gained renewed energy in recent years in part because it provides a basis
for evaluating a wide variety of contemporary institutional arrangements.3 Some scholars have speciﬁed the rule of law’s requirements for
adjudicative procedure.4 Others have looked to its complexion in
constitutional discourse.5 Some have speciﬁed the rule-of-law values for
new sets of institutions, such as global administrative institutions,6 or new
models of government action.7 Still others have explored its role in
fostering legality in conﬂict-torn societies.8
In light of the scope of lawmaking by administrative institutions—our
form of government is, importantly, administrative government9—the rule
of law’s demands of administrative government is a critical area of inquiry.
1. See Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure
[hereinafter Waldron, Importance of Procedure], in Getting to the Rule of Law 3, 3 (James
E. Fleming ed., 2011) [hereinafter Getting to the Rule of Law] (noting rule of law’s place
among “constellation of ideals that dominate our political morality”).
2. See, e.g., Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of Law 1, 2–4, in The
Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)
(describing Aristotle’s account of rule of law).
3. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1997) (noting a characteristic purpose is to serve as a
basis for evaluating practices—and their distance from ideal).
4. See, e.g., Waldron, Importance of Procedure, supra note 1, at 18 (providing
account of procedure as rule-of-law value).
5. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3, at 24–36 (examining role of invocations of rule of
law in constitutional debates).
6. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative
Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23, 32–33 (2009) (providing account of rule of law for global
administrative law).
7. See, e.g., Leighton McDonald, The Rule of Law in the ‘New Regulatory State’, 33
Common L. World Rev. 197, 215–21 (2004) (evaluating rule of law in light of new
governance techniques).
8. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, The Counterinsurgent’s Constitution: Law in the
Age of Small Wars 183–222 (2013) (examining rule of law’s meaning for societies
emerging from conﬂict).
9. See, e.g., Congress: Structure and Policy 403 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry
Sullivan eds., 1987) (“In this century, the nexus of policy making has largely shifted from
the constitutionally designated branches of government to the bureaucracy . . . .”); Peter
L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 575, 580–82 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of
Agencies] (describing elements of American administrative government).

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

1987

When scholars have addressed how the rule of law applies to the administrative state, the conversation has most often taken two forms. Some
scholars have proceeded inductively. They have sought to induce a set of
legality principles that structure particular administrative practices or
institutions.10 Following this course, the account of legality constraints
operating within the administrative state is built through case studies that
distill the operative constraints for particular administrative actors. At the
other extreme, work has fastened on the distance between administrative
institutions and some historical ideas of the rule of law.11 These scholars
conceive of the rule of law in terms of distinctive virtues of judicial or
legislative decision and ﬁnd that administrative institutions pose a
problem. But neither the more inductive studies nor the historically
rooted efforts devote much consideration to contemporary administrative
law—and to the ways in which it does or could provide a speciﬁcation of
the rule of law’s demands. This leaves some basic questions unanswered: In
what ways do current administrative law doctrines provide a speciﬁcation
of the rule of law’s requirements of administrative government? Is there an
account of our administrative law that pays particular heed to the values of
the rule of law?
To venture answers to these questions, one could not imagine a
stronger guide than Professor Peter L. Strauss. His insightful scholarship
on administrative government and law is comprehensive in scope and, at
every turn, deeply engaged with the values that undergird our commitments to law. This Essay develops an account of the rule of law’s demands
of administrative government by relying on Professor Strauss’s work as a
foundation for understanding how administrative law corresponds—or
should correspond—to the rule of law’s most basic principles.
This Essay approaches this task in two steps. The ﬁrst step, undertaken
in Part I, is to identify rule-of-law principles that are most relevant to the
administrative state. The focus on administrative institutions allows for
some principles, such as those pertaining to criminal prohibitions, to be
left aside. Other principles, such as the scope of authorization, procedural
fairness, and notice, are recurrent issues of concern for administrative
institutions and therefore merit greater emphasis. The result of this
analysis is a focus on ﬁve dimensions of the rule of law: (1) authorization,
(2) notice, (3) justiﬁcation, (4) coherence, and (5) procedural fairness.
10. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security and
Disability Claims 213–27 (1983) (providing account of internal legality of Social Security
Agency); Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond, 103
Geo. L.J. 259, 281–304 (2015) (providing case study of use of precedent and internal law in
Ofﬁce of Information and Regulatory Affairs’s (OIRA) review of agency rulemaking); Trevor
W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1492–511
(2010) (providing account of use of precedent within Ofﬁce of Legal Counsel (OLC)).
11. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Lawful? 5–7, 12–13 (2014)
(challenging legality of administrative state based on historical ideals of rule of law);
Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 72–87 (1994) (arguing government regulation
draws society away from rule of law as traditionally understood).
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The second step, in Part II, develops, with the help of Professor Strauss’s
work, an account of how administrative law embodies—or should reﬂect—
these principles. What emerges is the outline of an administrative jurisprudence.
The basic elements of that jurisprudence can be summarized as
follows. The ﬁrst dimension, authorization, is the very basic demand that
government action have a valid legal source. A starting premise of this
administrative jurisprudence is that authorization is personal to the ofﬁceholder, rather than an impersonal vesting of power in the government as a
whole. The idea is that each ofﬁcer vested with legal authority has
responsibility to reach an independent judgment about what the statute
requires, a judgment not to be supplanted by that of superiors. This
responsibility precludes the specter of a bureaucracy dictated by role-based
compliance up the chain of command in which only the highest-level
ofﬁcial bears genuine accountability. In other words, when role is deﬁned
in terms of independent judgment, role-based compliance privileges an
ofﬁcial’s independent evaluation over political loyalty or bureaucratic
order. If individual judgment by agency ofﬁcials is a structural premise for
the rule of law within the administrative state, then it makes sense that the
other aspects of the rule of law will apply to how agency ofﬁcials exercise
their discretion. That holds with regard to the principles of notice,
justiﬁcation, and coherence.
The second dimension, the cluster of values relating to notice—
principles of publicity, clarity, prospectivity, and stability prominent in
Professor Lon Fuller’s account of law’s virtues12—has been thought to
pose particular problems for the regulatory state. Regulatory statutes—
the statutes that create and delegate to agencies authority to make law—
are famously broad and vague. But because notice values seek to protect
law’s capacity to guide action, they should apply to the sources of law that
directly bind private parties. In our government, that means a critical
battleground for these principles is the law issued by agencies because
that regulatory law, rather than the legislation authorizing the agencies
to act, bears the weight of imposing obligations on private persons. Once
these notice values are seen as applicable to the law agencies issue, there
are grounds to ask how well agencies are meeting these demands. In this
vein, if rules generally fare better with regard to notice values than
adjudication, then there are reasons to require agencies to, at a
minimum, justify opting for adjudication instead of rulemaking. This
focus also suggests agencies have an obligation, when rulemaking is not
practicable, to issue some kind of guidance document reﬂecting the
agency’s best view of the statute’s requirements.
The third and fourth dimensions, justiﬁcation and coherence, also
bear on how agencies exercise their judgment. The coherence of law—
12. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 46–90 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing these
values are fundamental to law).
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law constituting an integral system—is not built into the American style
of statute-making. As a result, the rule-of-law burden of creating
coherence falls upon agencies and courts; they have a responsibility to
implement the statutes they administer in ways that promote the coherence of law, including implementing their statutes in a way that is
consistent with constitutional considerations and other background
values. This suggests a rule-of-law basis for understanding agency statutory interpretation as involving what scholars have called administrative
constitutionalism.13 The same holds for the rule-of-law requirement of
reasoned justiﬁcation. If agencies are the primary implementers of
statutory law, then law’s demand for justiﬁcation depends importantly
upon their practices. This provides a rule-of-law basis for administrative
law’s high demands for reasoned justiﬁcation.
The ﬁnal dimension, procedural fairness, makes particular demands
of agency adjudicators. While the rule of law does not dictate a particular
structure of government—whether parliamentary or separated powers—
it does insist on virtues of procedural fairness for adjudicators. The
implication is a rule-of-law grounding for insulating adjudicators from
political oversight.
Before proceeding, two qualiﬁcations are in order. First, a consistent
strain of Professor Strauss’s teaching is the importance of contextual
understanding of events and legal events in particular. Context comes in,
and is deeply informative, at every turn. Accordingly, looking to Professor
Strauss’s work with an eye toward specifying a set of rule-of-law principles
for administrative governance rests in some tension with his consistent
emphasis on contextual understanding, including in case studies. Second,
having identiﬁed this project, but not one that in so many terms Professor
Strauss has directly invited, it should be clear that any of its shortcomings
reﬂect on the present author. Indeed, in places, the Essay highlights the
rule-of-law foundations of propositions Professor Strauss defends; at other
times it builds upon his ideas to deﬁne principles beyond those he has
embraced. The hope still is that stepping back in this way will provide a
wide lens both for appreciating aspects of Professor Strauss’s contributions,
and, at the same time, making some progress toward articulating the broad
outlines of the rule-of-law demands of our administrative government.
I. THE DIMENSIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW
This Part provides a brief account of the ideal of the rule of law and
its underlying purposes, and then turns to describe five dimensions of the
rule of law particularly salient for assessing administrative governance.

13. See Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 522 (2010) [hereinafter Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law]
(providing account of role of constitutional interpretation in agency statutory implementation).
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The rule of law retains a place at the center of our political morality;
it is an ideal, like democracy, that sits among a small cluster of our most
basic commitments.14 But in order to identify the elements of this ideal,
one needs to have an account of what purposes the rule of law serves.15
In other words, we need to know what the rule of law is for—what values
it protects—before we can identify its core principles.16
While the purposes of the ideal are contested, it is possible to identify
several underlying values common to most accounts of the rule of law.
First, perhaps the most basic, is the idea of constraint, which applies to
ofﬁcials as well as citizens. In this regard, the rule of law is frequently
identiﬁed with decisionmaking conﬁned by some source other than
personal preference, ideology, or a personal sense of justice.17 This constraint protects against arbitrary decisionmaking, which stands in
opposition to law.18 Second, law aims to allow people to plan with some
measure of conﬁdence in their capacity to know the legal consequences of
their actions.19 Thus, law should give private parties adequate notice and
be of a form that they can make sense of so that they can conform their
conduct to its requirements.20 Third, law should provide a mechanism for
resolving disputes that is fair.21 Even when law is accessible and clear, and
even when decisionmaking is suitably constrained, there is independent
value in resolving disputes in a manner that is procedurally fair.
Contemporary accounts of the ideal identify elements or principles
that embody or carry forward these rule-of-law purposes.22 In this regard,
rule-of-law theories have a tendency toward lists of elements. Professor
14. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law:
Essays on Law and Morality 210–11 (2d ed. 2009) (noting rule of law’s status as
fundamental commitment); Fallon, supra note 3, at 3 (noting centrality of rule of law to
our political traditions); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga. L. Rev.
1, 3 (2008) [hereinafter Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law] (linking rule of law
and democracy as basic political commitments).
15. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 7 (noting efforts to specify meaning of rule of law
begin with identifying values it serves).
16. Martin Krygier, Four Puzzles About the Rule of Law, in Getting to the Rule of
Law, supra note 1, at 64, 67 (arguing proper place to start is with question of what rule of
law is for prior to evaluating its elements).
17. Ronald A. Cass, The Rule of Law in America 17 (2001) (noting importance of
external constraint); Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, supra note 14, at 6
(noting common feature of rule of law is that government exercises power “within a
constraining framework of public norms, rather than on the basis of their own
preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and wrong”).
18. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 3, at 8 (identifying protection against official
arbitrariness as purpose of rule of law); Krygier, supra note 16, at 76–81 (identifying
avoiding arbitrariness as chief value of rule of law).
19. Fallon, supra note 3, at 8 (noting this purpose).
20. Waldron, Importance of Procedure, supra note 1, at 18.
21. Id. at 6 (specifying procedures necessary for rule of law).
22. Fallon, supra note 3, at 8 (noting modern theories defend elements of rule of law
from account of its purposes).
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Fuller, the fount of much modern thought on the rule of law, identiﬁes
eight principles as critical to law: (1) generality, (2) publicity, (3) prospectivity, (4) clarity, (5) consistency, (6) stability, (7) capacity to be performed, and (8) compliance by ofﬁcials.23 Professor Joseph Raz offers an
account with a more institutional complexion. In addition to the virtues of
stability, openness, and clarity as virtues of law and lawmaking, which have
some cognates within Professor Fuller’s principles, Professor Raz also
isolates (1) the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, (2) accessibility of courts, and (3) conﬁned discretion of crime-preventing
authorities.24 In addition to, or instead of these values, others have emphasized that law be (1) authorized,25 (2) coherent or part of a system,26 (3)
accompanied by justiﬁcation,27 and (4) procedurally fair.28
Focusing on the rule of law’s requirements of administrative institutions, some principles can be left to the side and some have greater
importance.29 Those elements that pertain to criminal sanctions and
processes have less relevance, at least if we focus on those aspects of
administrative governance that are not involved in criminal justice.
Likewise, other general virtues, such as compliance with the law, do not
distinctively apply to administrative institutions. The conditions under
which administrative bodies operate make other elements of the rule of
law more central. The fact that agencies only have authority that has
been delegated to them suggests the critical importance of the principle
that official action be authorized. The fact that many statutes that delegate regulatory authority grant broad discretion to officials suggests the
importance of notice, coherence, and justiﬁcation. If agency officials are
creating law under broad standards, they have obligations to do so in
ways that provide adequate notice and justiﬁcation and also respond to
the values of coherence. Finally, to the extent that agencies are engaged
23. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 46–90 (defending these elements of virtues of law).
24. See Raz, supra note 14, at 214–18 (noting these values). For an account of Albert
Venn Dicey’s conception of the rule of law as a formal and procedural view, see Paul P.
Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytic Framework,
1997 Pub. L. 467, 470–74 (distinguishing substantive and procedural conceptions).
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jowell, The Rule of Law and Its Underlying Values, in The
Changing Constitution 3, 17–18 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 7th ed. 2011) (ebook)
(noting rule of law requires public officials act within powers conferred upon them).
26. See, e.g., Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, supra note 14, at 32–36
(noting requirement of systematicity or coherence).
27. See, e.g., Waldron, Importance of Procedure, supra note 1, at 6 (arguing rule of
law requires action “on the basis of evidence” and “right to make legal argument about
the bearing of the evidence”).
28. See generally, e.g., Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, supra note 14
(“[T]he Rule of Law is violated when due attention is not paid to . . . procedural matters
or when the institutions that are supposed to embody these procedures are undermined
or interfered with.”).
29. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 6 (noting different values are presumptively primary
under different conditions).
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in adjudication, the values of procedural fairness apply. This suggests
focus on the following ﬁve elements or dimensions of the rule of law.
(1) Authorization. Authorization is a bedrock principle of liberalism
and the rule of law; it ensures that the state only act or constrict an
individual’s liberty when authorized to do so.30 Authorization demands a
positive law source that grants power to the government to act. A system
that complies with authorization is one in which official acts are within
the scope of powers authorized, or not ultra vires
(2) Notice. Many of the most commonly identiﬁed features of the
rule of law pertain to a cluster of characteristics that help to ensure that
law has the capacity to be practical in the sense of providing guidance to
an individual’s actions and allowing individuals to plan with some
knowledge of the law. The principles of publicity, clarity, consistency,
prospectivity, and stability are among the most important of these
values.31 Some of these principles are nearly categorical. There can be no
basis to demand compliance with nonpublic or secret laws. To be actionguiding, laws must be knowable and public. Likewise, a retroactive law
cannot purport to guide conduct. Some of these values are a matter of
degree; it is more difficult to comply with laws that are unclear,
inconsistent, or change so quickly that they cannot (reasonably) claim to
be capable of guiding action.
(3) Justiﬁcation. An important strain of thought about the rule of law
focuses on the role of justiﬁcation and argumentation in law. Justiﬁcation
provides protection against arbitrariness; part of what deﬁnes arbitrary
action is action that is not justiﬁed. As Professor Jeremy Waldron writes,
[L]aw is an argumentative discipline, and no analytic
theory of what law is and what distinguishes legal systems
from other systems of governance can afford to ignore
this aspect of our legal practice and the distinctive role it
plays in a legal system’s treating ordinary citizens with
respect as active centers of intelligence.32
Or, as Professors David Dyzenhaus and Michael Taggart put it, our
legal system reﬂects “the pull of justiﬁcation, meaning that public power
is considered authoritative when and only when it justiﬁes its exercise to

30. See Cass, supra note 17, at 12–13 (identifying valid authority as element of rule of
law); McDonald, supra note 7, at 204 (noting as fundamental element of rule of law that
political power be authorized); see also Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the
Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and Legal Theory 163 (1957) (“[T]he state may
intervene with the individual’s liberty—but ﬁrst it must prove that it may do so.”).
31. See Fuller, supra note 12, 46–90 (arguing for place of these values as central to
law’s virtue); Raz, supra note 14, at 214–16 (defending requirement that law be prospective, open, clear, and general).
32. Waldron, Importance of Procedure, supra note 1, at 21–22 (citing Neil MacCormick,
Rhetoric and the Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning 14–15, 26–28 (2005)).
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those whom it affects.”33 This demand for justiﬁcation, and thus practices
of reason-giving and processes for argumentation, are grounded in law’s
respect for human agency and dignity, and treatment of law’s subjects as
“bearers of reason and intelligence.”34
(4) Coherence. Law presents itself as a system in which norms ﬁt
together.35 It is from the perspective of the private party—the individual
or ﬁrm subject to law’s demands—that coherence matters. “For citizens,
law is inevitably an integral system, premised in contemporary social
expectations and political judgments; a person interested in her legal
obligations looks to the whole environment, not a disordered collection
of fragmentary, isolated, mutually independent pieces.”36 This does not
say how coherence is achieved, but it does emphasize the importance of
viewing coherence from the perspective of the private individual subject
to law’s obligations.
(5) Procedural Fairness. A central virtue of the rule of law is
procedural fairness, that is, the set of institutional arrangements that
provide an unbiased determination of one’s rights and duties through
transparent procedures with determinations based on evidence. Here the
rule of law joins company with the most basic elements of due process,
though it can be more demanding.37
*

*

*

One might quarrel with these dimensions as either under- or overinclusive. The aim of this Essay is not to deﬁnitively identify the best set
of rule-of-law principles. Rather, the hope instead is that this list is useful
in that it captures a set of values of particular importance to legality
within administrative governance.
II. RULE-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE
The question to ask now—with aid from Professor Strauss—is how
we can specify these general rule-of-law principles in the context of
administrative governance. In what ways are these principles applied in
our administrative law? In what way do they ground arguments for an
33. David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in
Common Law Theory 135, 152 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007).
34. Waldron, Importance of Procedure, supra note 1, at 19.
35. See Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, supra note 14, at 32–36
(discussing systematicity as legal value).
36. Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994
Sup. Ct. Rev. 429, 442 [hereinafter Strauss, Resegregating].
37. Whereas trial by an elected judge does not violate the Due Process Clause, see
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 782–84 (2002) (noting elected
judges always face pressure from electorate regarding content of their rulings but rejecting
view that Due Process Clause prohibits election of judges), there may be reasons from the
perspective of the rule of law to question the impartiality of elected judges.
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account of that law? This Part takes on that task organized around the
ﬁve dimensions of the rule of law just discussed.
A.

Authorization

Authorization is a central principle of the rule of law and also a
central occupation of administrative law. The rule-of-law principle is that
government may act and may constrict an individual’s liberty only when
authorized to do so.38 That is, government’s actions must be authorized
by some valid source.39 Within our system of limited government, with a
Constitution creating a government of only enumerated powers, an
administrative agency only has those powers Congress confers upon it.40
Administrative law thus must provide an account of which officials may
exercise delegated statutory power and how the scope of that power is to
be judged. Professor Strauss’s answers to these widely contested questions
have distinctive grounding in rule-of-law considerations and suggest two
rule-of-law principles for administrative government. These principles
share a common conception of the value of independent legal judgment
for administrative officials and for courts.
1. Decisional Allocation. — One pillar of Professor Strauss’s approach
to public law is an insistence that decisional allocation—attention to
which official has been vested with power—matters to the chances of
government in accordance with law. To be clear, the critical issue is not
what occurs when one agency exercises powers delegated to another
agency. Nor is the principal issue the commonplace practice of subordinate officials acting under the general authority and direction of their
superiors; that is a simple fact of organizational life. Rather, in the
United States, the signiﬁcant question of decisional allocation arises with
respect to the scope of the President’s powers over officials who are
delegated powers and vested with nonministerial duties by statute,
whether or not they are protected from removal by good cause protections. What power does the President have to legally bind the
discretion of, for example, the Secretary of Transportation, the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, or the members
of the Securities Exchange Commission?
Professor Strauss is the leading contemporary defender of the view
that when Congress imposes duties and grants discretion to ofﬁces or
agencies, those duties and that discretion are personal to the

38. See supra note 30 (citing sources and describing authorization as element of rule
of law).
39. See Cass, supra note 17, at 12 (noting valid authorization as element of rule of
law).
40. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”).
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ofﬁceholder.41 In other words, absent special circumstances, the President
does not have legal authority either to supplant that ofﬁcial’s act or to bind
the ofﬁcial to a particular action when that ofﬁcial has been granted
statutory authority. The power vested by statute is the ofﬁcial’s, not the
President’s. As Professor Strauss puts it succinctly, in these cases, the
President is the “overseer and not the decider.”42 This position has both a
constitutional and statutory dimension. As to the Constitution, this
position rejects the view, commonly associated with a strongly unitary
conception of the executive, that the Constitution requires reading any
grant of authority to an ofﬁcial as authorizing the President to act in the
ofﬁcial’s stead.43 As to statutory construction, this position takes delegations to executive branch ofﬁcials as well as to independent agencies as
vesting power in the chosen ofﬁcial, not the President.44 The focus on
41. See Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696, 704–05 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, The
President in Administrative Law] (arguing in ordinary administrative contexts, where
Congress delegates to named agency official, President’s role is supervisor, not decider);
see also Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 9, at 649 (arguing Congress has power
“to place the responsibility for decision in a department rather than the President”); Peter
L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court’s
Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789, 808 (“The legal authority to act is then that
of the delegate, and even for indisputably executive agencies the President’s power of
direction appears limited in ways that make it difficult to characterize him as the
delegate.”). This position has a long history. See, e.g., 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823), 1823
WL 538, at 625 (“If the laws . . . require a particular officer by name to perform a duty, . . .
no other officer can perform it without violation of the law; and were the President to
perform it, . . . he would be violating [the law] himself.”); Edward S. Corwin, The
President: Office and Powers 1787–1984, at 94–100 (5th rev. ed. 1984) (arguing duties
imposed on named offices are not President’s in part to give Congress a choice to delegate
to entity other than President). For other explorations, see, e.g., infra notes 43–44
(collecting sources), as well as Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency
Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533, 539 (1989) (arguing President lacks directive
authority when Congress delegates to other officials); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R.
Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 25 n.97 (1995) (arguing
against President’s directive authority over agencies).
42. Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 41, at 704–05.
43. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 596 & n.210 (1994) (arguing delegations to executive
officials should be construed to permit President to exercise officials’ delegated powers
directly, for instance, by personally issuing standards of workplace safety in stead of
Secretary of Labor).
44. See Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 41, 713–17 (arguing
delegation to ofﬁcials does not grant President access to those powers). Others have joined
this debate. For arguments that the President has authority to exercise powers delegated to
other executive ofﬁcials, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev.
2245, 2327–30 (2001) (arguing delegations to executive branch ofﬁcials authorize President
to exercise ofﬁcials’ powers); Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory
Authority over Agency Action, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 2455, 2458–74 (2011) (arguing
delegations to executive ofﬁcials do not imply limit on President’s directive authority). For
arguments that the President generally lacks statutory authority to direct the exercise of
power granted to other ofﬁcials, see, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the
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decisional allocation thus maintains that Congress, in delegating authority,
may make a meaningful choice among delegates, including granting
power to the President, but also to other ofﬁcials.45
While this position on decisional allocation has been widely debated
in constitutional and statutory terms, it can be seen as grounded in a
distinctive set of commitments about the prospects for government under
law. “[T]here is a difference between ordinary respect and political deference, on the one hand, and law-compelled obedience, on the other,”
Professor Strauss writes; “[t]he subordinate’s understanding which of these
is owed, and what is her personal responsibility, has implications for what it
means to have a government under laws.”46 The suggestion here is that
when an ofﬁcial views her duties under statute as her own, that fundamentally shapes the “frame of mind” or the “psychology of ofﬁce”47 in
which the ofﬁceholder receives urgings from superiors (and others). At
the most basic level, “someone told me to do it” is excluded as a sufﬁcient
ground for action by an ofﬁcial vested with delegated power. Such a
delegate should generally grant respectful consideration to the views of
superiors, but the duty and power of decision are ultimately her own. For a
decision to be the ofﬁcial’s own, she must be independently convinced of
the action’s legality and appropriateness.
This insistence on decisional allocation thus can be seen as grounded
in a pragmatic principle that there is a greater chance of decision in
accordance with the law when ofﬁcials view their duties and powers as
personal, requiring their independent judgment, and not subject to
supplanting by others. This idea can be put in terms of the deﬁnition of
role for administrative actors. When the legal role of those delegated
statutory power is deﬁned as requiring their independent judgment, the
specter of role-based compliance up a chain of command is diminished.
Institutionally, this role speciﬁcation spreads accountability through the
bureaucracy. All those with legally delegated authority must exercise their
own independent legal judgment; as a result, administrative action will
represent the views of many actors, and accountability cannot be conﬁned
to the ofﬁcials at the peak of the institutional hierarchy. These ideas about
the foundation for decisional allocation might be formulated in terms of
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 Duke L.J. 963, 1007–11 (2001)
(raising statutory, historical, and policy arguments why President lacks directive authority);
Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
263, 276–99 (2006) (arguing congressional delegation practices undermine inference of
implied delegation to President when Congress names another ofﬁcial).
45. See Strauss, The President in Administrative Law, supra note 41, at 713 (discussing
view that inability of Congress to delegate authority exclusively to executive ofﬁcials
“render[s] it impossible for Congress . . . to leave anything to the specially trained judgment
of a subordinate executive ofﬁcial” without risking politicization of ofﬁcial’s decisions
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Edward S. Corwin, The President: Ofﬁce and
Powers 1787–1957, at 80 (4th rev. ed. 1957))).
46. Id. at 704 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 712–13.
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the following rule-of-law principle for administration: Legal authorization
(and duty) is relative to ofﬁceholders, not an impersonal authorization to
government as a whole.
While this principle is articulated at a relatively high level of
generality, it takes a stance on the contested question of the President’s
powers over law administration. Understanding this legal allocation—that
the discretion and duty is personal to the ofﬁcial—clariﬁes how an ofﬁcial
delegated with statutory power is to understand prodding from a President
or his immediate advisors. The ofﬁcial is not to take that direction “as a
command that she has a legal as well as a political obligation to honor, and
for whose justiﬁcations she thus has no particular responsibility.”48 As
opposed to hierarchical military command, the principle of decisional
allocation maintains that the dialogue between the President and the
agency is necessarily anchored in the requirement of authorization and,
consequently, the goals of the underlying delegating legislation, which are
the core positive foundations for statutory law implementation. If the
responsibility is the ofﬁcial’s, it is the ofﬁcial who must be convinced and
who is ultimately accountable for the decision. The President, then, must
persuade the ofﬁcial.
This position does not deny that politically appointed officials are
picked and vetted to carry out their duties in accordance with the
President’s priorities,49 nor that many of them may be ﬁred by the
President at will for failing to do so. Nor does it deny that there are
relevant differences between the weight of presidential priorities for
executive and independent agencies. But it still insists that even for
executive officials, as well as those further down the institutional hierarchy, there is a distinction worth maintaining about whose duty and power
is at issue. While this position augments the place of disagreement within
the administration, the prospect for disagreement provides an indication
and assurance that independent judgment, typically from multiple
individuals, has been exercised.
Inquiring into the fundamental rule-of-law demand for authorization within the administrative context thus reveals the need to make a
distinction between authorization as an impersonal grant of powers to
government and authorization as delegation to particular officeholders.
Viewing obligations as personal to the officeholder opens up a prospect
for legal accountability within hierarchical institutions foreclosed by
glossing over or denying this distinction.
2. Scope of Authority. — But what is the scope of authority granted?
Because agencies only have powers granted to them by statute, the rule
48. Id. at 712.
49. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 4 (1994), reprinted as amended in 3 U.S.C.
§ 601 app. at 803 (2012) (providing consistency with President’s priorities is part of
regulatory planning process); id. § 6(b) (providing OIRA may review agency action for
consistency with President’s priorities).
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of law clearly requires that an agency act within the scope of that
delegated power. Indeed, this ultra vires principle—that only authorized
action is valid—is, and could be nothing other than, a cornerstone of
administrative law.
While all agree that agencies can act only within the scope of their
authorization, there is wide disagreement over how that scope is to be
determined. This question is at the center of the persisting and generative
debate over Chevron and its “ﬁrst step” inquiry into the statutory
permissibility of agency action. Chevron asks the reviewing court to ﬁrst
assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”50 Many view this ﬁrst inquiry into the scope of statutory
authorization as one that a court could only ask de novo without any form
of deference to the agency’s position.51 Others, concerned about judicial
overreaching and micromanagement of agencies, suggest that delegation
of technical and other matters to the agency qualiﬁes the judicial inquiry.52
On this question, fundamental to the rule of law’s application,
Professor Strauss stakes out a middle position that, on the one hand,
recognizes the underlying reasons for creation of agencies as part of
government and, on the other hand, does not withdraw from the insistence on an independent judicial determination of the scope of an agency’s
authority.53 Professor Strauss takes as fundamental that the structure of
government—a structure created by law—should inform the way in which
courts approach the task of determining the legality of the government
action they review. His account thus offers a description of the shape of
ultra vires review for the administrative context.
Professor Strauss is clear that the question of the scope of an
agency’s authority—that is, whether an agency is acting within its
“boundaries”54—is ineluctably and appropriately an issue for independent judicial evaluation.55 But he is equally clear that independent
50. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
51. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 779, 782 & n.7 (2010)
(arguing Chevron should be overruled as poorly justiﬁed and inconsistent with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
52. Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 555 (2009)
(arguing congressional rationale for interpretive delegation should determine level of
scrutiny of statute’s meaning).
53. See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1143, 1145, 1150 (2012) [hereinafter
Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing] (noting determination of powers vested in agencies
is judicial responsibility).
54. Id. at 1150.
55. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 Va. L.
Rev. 611, 611 (2009) (noting Chevron’s step-one question of scope of power granted is for
independent judicial judgment); Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at
1165 (noting scope of powers vested to agency is matter to be judicially determined); Peter
L. Strauss, Overseers or “The Deciders”—The Courts in Administrative Law, 75 U. Chi. L.
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judicial judgment does not exclude—and indeed should include—a
court giving “weight” to the agency’s judgment. “The lines deﬁning an
agency’s Chevron space must be judicially determined, a determination
that is, irreducibly, a statement of what the law is. But that unmistakably
judicial determination should be informed by agency judgments in ways
that have been conventional at least since 1827.”56 In short, courts should
review whether the agency has acted within the scope of its authority—
the Chevron step-one question—by according Skidmore weight to the
agency’s judgments.57 Skidmore weight regards “the rulings, interpretations and opinions” of the agency as representing “a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance,” depending on “the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”58
Professor Strauss defends this position as the best reading of precedent but also the approach that makes most sense of the agency’s position
in government.59 Congress vests the agency with the statutory duty to

Rev. 815, 819 (2008) [hereinafter Strauss, Courts in Administrative Law] (“Chevron step
one is the terrain of independent (albeit perhaps inﬂuenced) judicial judgment . . . .”).
56. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at 1165; Strauss, Courts in
Administrative Law, supra note 55, at 818 (explicating precedential grounding for this
position); see also Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 796
(2014) [hereinafter Strauss, In Search of Skidmore] (“One can readily agree . . . that
[w]hether Congress has conferred such power is the relevant question[] . . . that must be
answered before affording Chevron deference, without . . . having to agree that whether an
agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.”
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at 1153–56 (invoking
Skidmore weight in reference to formulation of deference in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944)).
58. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139–40.
59. As to precedent, Professor Strauss reminds us that judicial review of agency action
did not begin with Chevron or the APA, and that Chevron actually provided an awkward
reformulation of principles well established at the time. See Strauss, Deference Is Too
Confusing, supra note 53, at 1161–63 (suggesting Chevron ﬁts awkwardly with prior leading
decisions). Pre–APA judicial review comprehended that independent judicial review of the
agency’s authority, even when understood as an exclusive judicial function, did not prevent
giving due consideration to the “contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men
[and women] charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of
making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Id. at
1155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)). Pre–APA review also recognized that when the
agency had been allocated authority to establish policy, the court’s role in reviewing
agency actions falling within the boundaries of its authority was of oversight and
supervision. See id. at 1159–61 (explicating rule of reviewing court under NLRB v. Hearst
Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944)); see also Strauss, Courts in Administrative Law, supra
note 55, at 818 (same). Professor Strauss argues that lines of current judicial doctrine have
unsettled these understandings reﬂected in the APA by assuming that independent review
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deﬁnitively implement the statutory scheme and to make sense of it in
relation to other laws.60 The justiﬁcation for granting agencies’ views
binding authority within their powers does not vanish when the question is
the scope of the agency’s powers.61 In other words, the fact that a statute
allocates interpretive authority to the agency to specify the statute’s
meaning does not undermine, but rather provides grounds for taking
seriously the agency’s views about the scope of that authority. This perspective thus emphasizes the categorization of these issues for the purposes of
judicial review—for instance, determining the scope of authority as
opposed to review of acts within that scope—should not sweep aside the
underlying continuity that it is the same ofﬁcial or agency acting.
This middle position provides a speciﬁcation of ultra vires review for
administrative governance. Acting within the scope of legal authorization
is too basic to government under law to evade independent judicial
review. But the structure of that review should reﬂect, not contradict, the
underlying place of the agency within government. Accordingly, the
justiﬁcation for a court recognizing that the agency has been vested with
power to decide authoritatively within its sphere of powers—a justiﬁcation drawing from congressional choice and agency experience—does
not vanish when the question is the scope of those powers. In this sense,
the court’s commitment to ensuring compliance with the law is not
disconnected from an understanding of the legal system as a whole, and
the place of the agency within it. This speciﬁcation could be seen as
founded on a more general rule-of-law principle for administrative
government: that the shape of ultra vires review should reﬂect the underlying legal allocation of authority, such that independent review may still
involve respectful consideration of the views of those delegated power in
the ﬁrst instance.
This understanding of the judicial role has deep roots in public law
in the United States. In particular, it has strong parallels to Professor
James Thayer’s classic position on the narrow role of courts in reviewing
the constitutionality of legislation.62 Professor Thayer argued that with
regard to the “momentous” power of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation, courts should grant Congress’s views respect
because Congress has been expressly entrusted by the Constitution with
the exercise of legislative powers, “not merely of enacting laws, but of
excludes giving weight to the agency’s view. See Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, supra note
56, at 796 (criticizing City of Arlington on this ground).
60. See Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at 1146 (observing
agencies have authority to act deﬁnitively and responsibility to implement statute in
coherent way).
61. See id. (arguing agency’s responsibilities and authority justify granting Skidmore
weight in judicial determination of scope of its powers).
62. See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 140 (1893) (developing early theory of role of
courts in review of legislation for constitutionality).
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putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall deeply affect
the whole country, enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the most
serious affairs.”63 For Professor Thayer, this “respect” was not a matter of
mere courtesy, but based on “very solid” grounds of “policy and law.”64
The Constitution’s entrusting to Congress not merely the power of
preliminary or provisional action but presumptively ﬁnal action,65 for
Professor Thayer, narrows the judicial role.66 Much the same logic applies
with regard to judicial review of the scope of an agency’s powers. While
agencies lack the direct electoral connection of Congress, under many
statutory delegations, their actions, too, are presumptively ﬁnal. Accordingly, respect for their judgments is not merely a matter of courtesy, but
also grounded in law. Giving agencies’ views “weight” even in the
determination of their authority offers ﬁdelity to the law in Professor
Thayer’s sense—it recognizes that the allocation of responsibility is to the
agency to act with presumptive ﬁnality. In short, how authority is judged
is a function in part of how it is initially allocated.
As Professor Strauss acknowledges, this perspective confronts challenges today. Independent judicial review of an agency’s action is often
reﬂexively understood to exclude giving the agency’s view any weight.67
To take one example, consider how the Supreme Court understands the
judicial task in Chevron’s ﬁrst step. As Professor Strauss writes, both the
majority and the dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC 68 pass over the
possibility that one of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation
applicable at the ﬁrst step of the Chevron inquiry is according some
weight to the agency’s views.69 Instead, both opinions take independent
judicial inquiry to exclude weight to the agency’s views.70 As a result,
Skidmore’s advice to give due weight to the agency’s views is made relevant
only outside of Chevron’s application instead of within it. What is lost is a
prospect for greater accommodation of the underlying allocation of legal
authority within the framework of judicial review.
3. Conclusion. — Viewing together these two principles of
authorization—decisional allocation and deference as to scope—reveals
an interesting commonality as to the value of independent legal judg63. Id. at 136.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 135 (“[C]onstitutions not merely intrust to the legislatures a preliminary
determination of the question, but [also] contemplate that this determination may be the
ﬁnal one . . . .”).
66. Id. at 135–36 (observing power of “putting an interpretation on the constitution
which shall deeply affect the whole country” is given to legislature, and, as a result,
legislature’s determinations warrant respect).
67. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, supra note 56, at 795–96 (noting City of Arlington Court
assumed Chevron’s ﬁrst step could not involve any form of deference to agency’s views).
68. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
69. See Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, supra note 56, at 795–96 (critiquing City of
Arlington on this ground).
70. Id. (observing this view among opinions in City of Arlington).
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ment for administrative governance. Independent judgment appears as a
virtue that applies to a wider range of legal officials but permits greater
consideration of the views of others than many suppose. The principle of
decisional allocation is premised in part on the idea that independent
judgment is a fundamental value in the executive branch and an
unavoidable duty of executive officials, not just a virtue reserved for
courts or only particular “independent” agencies. Thus the duty has wide
application. At the same time, exercising independent judgment does
not preclude giving weight to the views of other actors—regardless of
whether that independent judgment is exercised by an executive branch
official or a court—and so is less demanding than some assume. This
view thus sees an underlying commonality in the legal duties of agency
officials and courts; both labor under the burdens of independent
judgment, but under the rule of law, such laboring does not require
isolation or excluding due consideration of others’ views.
B.

Notice

At the center of most accounts of the rule of law is a cluster of
formal characteristics that assist law in guiding individuals’ actions.71
Principles of publicity, clarity, consistency, prospectivity, and stability are
among the most important.72 To the extent the law falls short of these
principles, it is difficult to maintain that individuals have reasonable
notice.
Administrative government has been thought to pose particular
challenges for this cluster of formal values. In particular, scholars argue that
delegation of lawmaking authority in extremely broad terms to agencies
undermines these notice values.73 As a result, in the administrative context,
the ﬁrst issue is to clarify the type of law to which these principles apply. This
section ﬁrst argues that these notice principles apply to law that binds the
public, which in our system is frequently the rules and other law produced
by agencies. Based on that premise, this section then discusses two further
implications. If rulemaking fares better than adjudication with regard to
these notice values, then these principles may impose a prima facie
obligation on agencies to engage in rulemaking. In addition, it argues that
agencies also have an obligation to issue prospective guidance as a secondbest option when rulemaking is not practicable.

71. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 12, at 53 (“Law has to do with the governance of
human conduct by rules.”); Fallon, supra note 3, at 8 (“The ﬁrst element [of the rule of
law] is the capacity of legal rules . . . to guide people in the conduct of their affairs.”).
72. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 46–90 (defending publicity, prospectivity, clarity,
consistency, and stability as among requirements for law); Raz, supra note 14, at 214–16
(arguing law must be prospective, open, clear, and general).
73. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 11, at 75–76 (arguing rule of law requires
government be “bound by rules ﬁxed and announced beforehand” and is therefore
undermined by “discretion left to the executive organs”).
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1. The Locus of Notice Demands. — If these notice principles of the
rule of law—publicity, clarity, consistency, prospectivity, and stability—
apply directly to regulatory legislation, such legislation fails to comply in
several important respects. A basic feature of our administrative government is broad legislative delegations to administrative officials and
agencies, delegations that are not only broadly worded but also do not
impose obligations directly on private parties—characteristics for which
Professor Edward Rubin proposes the term “intransitive.”74 Modern
legislation “in its essence is an institutional practice by which the legislature, as our basic policy-making body, issues directives to the governmental mechanisms that implement policy.”75 To be sure, Congress does
enact some statutes that impose obligations directly on private persons,
and some statutes are written with a great deal of speciﬁcity. But as
administrative lawyers and political scientists have long recognized, the
vast weight of modern legislation “regulates the behavior of government
agencies, not the conduct of private persons.”76 As opposed to creating
primary obligations for private parties, regulatory statutes structure the
processes, means, and considerations for agencies. These familiar
features of regulatory statutes have important consequences for rule-oflaw principles of notice: If the legal system’s compliance with these values
depends upon the text of regulatory statutes, we would be forced to
conclude either that the system dramatically falls short of these principles
or that these principles require revision.77
The same result does not follow, however, when we understand these
notice principles, as Professor Strauss argues, as “obligation[s] applicable
to the system”78 as opposed to regulatory legislation itself. On this view,
“[t]he agency’s development and enunciation of administrative policy”
provide the speciﬁcation of what the law demands of private parties.79
This position—that we should ask how agency actions imposing obligations on private parties comply with these formal rule-of-law values—
74. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L.
Rev. 369, 380–85 (1989).
75. Id. at 372; see also Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second
Republic of the United States 106 (2d ed. 1979) (“Obviously modern law has become a series
of instructions to administrators rather than a series of commands to citizens.”).
76. Rubin, supra note 74, at 376; see also David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran,
Delegating Powers: Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate
Powers 5 (1999) (noting broad delegation characterizes modern administrative state);
McCubbins & Sullivan, supra note 9, at 403 (“[T]he nexus of policy making has largely
shifted from the constitutionally designated branches of government to the
bureaucracy . . . .”).
77. Professor Rubin argues in this vein that “[w]hen a transitive statute is enforced by
an agency, our normative system simply does not make the demands that Fuller perceives.”
Rubin, supra note 74, at 399.
78. Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 427, 445 (1989) [hereinafter Strauss, Comments on Rubin].
79. Id.
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has strong theoretical foundations. As noted above, a fundamental aspect
of law is that it provides guidance as to the behavior of private parties—it
aims to impose practical obligations. To be action-guiding, however, law
must be accessible, consistent, reasonably clear and stable, and prospective.80 Based on the premise that these principles of the rule of law
seek to protect law’s action-guiding qualities, it makes sense that these
notice demands apply to agency action that binds private parties, and not
merely to delegating legislation. Accordingly, principles of notice
properly apply to agency action that creates binding obligations for
private parties as well as those aspects of statutes that do so. The system as
a whole is thus still on the hook for satisfying these formal demands. But
these demands apply to legal sources that bind the public, which include,
signiﬁcantly, the rules and decisions issued by administrative agencies.
At a practical level, this insight defuses some lines of challenge to
administrative governance that ﬁx upon legislation as the focus of these
rule-of-law values.81 But more importantly, recognizing that these formal
values apply to all sources of law governing private conduct in society
frames as a critical inquiry how well agencies comply with these
principles in their lawmaking. In other words, a critical element of
administrative agencies’ compliance with the rule of law is the ways in
which their lawmaking embodies the values of publicity, prospectivity,
clarity, and so on—that is, Professor Fuller’s demands of law need to be
brought into agency trenches.
Professor Strauss has long insisted on the fundamental rule-of-law
requirements of publicity for agency action82 and has been at the
vanguard of a forceful critique of agencies’ reliance on private standards,
not practically accessible without a fee, in their regulations.83 But
questions of the requisite clarity, prospectivity, and stability required of
regulations and other agency actions remain areas for further explo80. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 12, at 53 (“To speak of governing or directing
conduct today by rules that will be enacted tomorrow is to talk in blank prose.”).
81. See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 11, at 80–81 (arguing broad delegation threatens
rule of law).
82. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an
Executive Department: Reﬂections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the
Mining Law, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1231, 1238–40 (1974) [hereinafter Strauss, Rules,
Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law] (arguing internal organizational structure and
operating procedures should be published and internal operating manuals be publicly
available).
83. See Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 497, 560 (2013) (summarizing publicity norms when agencies incorporate
private standards); see also Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an OpenGovernment Age, 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 131, 153 (2013) (providing assessment of
public access problem for standards incorporative by reference in federal rules); Nina A.
Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory
Use of Private Standards, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 800 (2014) (arguing for full digital access
without charge to private standards incorporated by reference into agency rules).
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ration as part of the project of specifying the rule of law’s demands of
administrative governance.
2. Implications for “Choice” Among Policymaking Forms. — Many agencies
may implement their statutes in a variety of policymaking forms.84
Agencies may promulgate rules, conduct adjudications, issue interpretive
statements or guidance documents, compile and publish enforcement
manuals, create permitting schemes, conduct auctions, make grants, create
pilot projects, engage in research, and so on. Whether a policy is
implemented through rulemaking or adjudication often results from
organizational and institutional dynamics within the agency more than it
follows from a single decisionmaker’s conscious choice.85 It is nonetheless
still coherent to ask agencies as institutions to develop structures for
making informed allocations among policymaking forms.
Different policymaking forms fare better and worse than others with
regard to these rule-of-law notice principles. As Professor Strauss notes,
case-by-case adjudications, especially when unguided by strong agency
internal policy, are not only costly but can threaten “undesirable variation
in individual cases.”86 More generally, adjudicative decisionmaking
processes, like common law processes, strain this cluster of rule-of-law
virtues.87 In common law adjudication, “rules [are] created in the very
process of application” and thus apply “retroactively to facts arising prior
to the establishment of the rule.”88 As to values of prospectivity, clarity,
publicity, and generality, common law adjudication often fares worse than
prospective legislation. These same deﬁcits would also seem to apply to
administrative adjudication in comparison to rulemaking.
Based on the assumption that not all procedural forms are created
equal with regard to their compliance with formal rule-of-law principles—and, more speciﬁcally, that rulemaking is generally preferable—
those principles should supervene on how the agency allocates its
activities among procedural forms. Well-established judicial doctrine
effectively bars courts from second-guessing the agency’s choice about

84. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1383, 1383, 1386 (2004) [hereinafter Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form] (noting
agencies may implement statutes by rule, adjudication, or announcing interpretation).
85. See Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law, supra note 82, at
1258 (exposing how organizational dynamics, not singular agency judgments, led to
rulemaking or adjudication within Department of Interior).
86. Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L.J. 1463, 1482 (1992)
[hereinafter Strauss, Rulemaking Continuum].
87. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 455, 455 (1989)
(reviewing Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (1988)) (“[C]entral
features of common law method appear inconsistent with some of the primary assumptions
of a traditional view of the rule of law.”).
88. Id.
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the best policymaking form to use.89 Indeed, as Dean Elizabeth Magill
has highlighted, the agency’s discretion to opt for different policymaking
forms remains an exception to the general requirement that the agency
exercise its discretion in a reasoned way.90 Under current law, the agency
does not need to offer a justiﬁcation for its choice among alternative
procedural forms.
The diversity of agencies’ organizational structures and the practical
necessity of gaining more information about a regulatory environment
before developing a rule, among other considerations,91 counsel against
constricting established judicial tolerance for agency choice among
policymaking forms with a requirement that agencies utilize rulemaking
to the fullest extent possible. But the rule-of-law beneﬁts of rulemaking
over adjudication do impose some obligation on the agency. One
minimal way that obligation might be speciﬁed is an obligation that the
agency justify its choice of procedural form.92 Such a requirement of
justiﬁcation, whether or not judicially enforceable,93 would create the
occasion for agencies to self-consciously evaluate their chosen policymaking form relative to others available. The agency might justify its
choice to proceed through adjudication, for instance, because it does not
yet know enough about how the statute impacts the regulated
89. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II ) , 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
90. See Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, supra note 84, at 1415 (“There
is simply no such reason-giving requirement imposed on an agency when it selects its
choice of form.”); see also, e.g., Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203 (“Hence we refuse to say that
the Commission, which had not previously been confronted with the problem of
management trading during reorganization, was forbidden from utilizing [adjudication]
for announcing and applying a new standard of conduct.”). To put the point in the
shorthand of students of administrative law, the discretion to select among policymaking
forms that the Supreme Court embraced in its Chenery II decision is an exception to the
reason-giving requirements of its Chenery I opinion. See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I ) ,
318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“[T]he orderly functioning of the process of review requires that
the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and
adequately sustained.”).
91. See Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, supra note 84, at 1445–47
(arguing courts can address concerns related to agency’s choice of form through other
doctrines); Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law, supra note 82, at
1265–66 (arguing against requirement that agencies formulate policy through rules).
92. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 544 (2003) (suggesting agencies should
be required to justify opting for procedures other than rulemaking).
93. A useful analogy is the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s requirement that the agency
provide a “regulatory ﬂexibility analysis” that includes “a statement of the need for, and
objectives of, the rule,” 5 U.S.C. § 604 (2012), published in the Federal Register. 5 U.S.C.
§ 604(a)(6), (b). These requirements are “[p]urely procedural” and so “require[]
nothing more than that the agency ﬁle a [ﬁnal regulatory ﬂexibility analysis]
demonstrating a ‘reasonable, good-faith effort to carry out [RFA’s] mandate.’” U.S.
Cellular Corp. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 78, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Alenco Commc’ns, Inc. v.
FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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community to make a general rule, or based on considerations of timing.
But the requirement to make some comparative assessment to justify its
choices bridges internal agency silos and requires the agency make a
deliberate decision in light of the full complement of its powers. If not all
policymaking forms are created equal, and if agencies can adopt
structures that allow for deliberation over policymaking forms,94 a
requirement to justify the choice of form is a modest means of enforcing
these rule-of-law values of notice.
3. Obligation to Issue Guidance. — Attention to these notice values also
has implications for guidance documents. Guidance documents include
interpretations and policy statements of statutes and regulations that do
not have the authority to bind with the force of law, but may instruct
agency officials how to set forth the agency’s interpretation of a statute or
regulation, or exercise their discretion under a statutory scheme.95
Agency reliance on guidance documents has prompted considerable
criticism and calls for increased scrutiny.96
But guidance documents can have signiﬁcant rule-of-law beneﬁts. As
Professor Strauss observes, “The usual interface between a member of
the public and an agency does not involve the agency head, but a
relatively low-level member of staff . . . .”97 That interface is rife with the
possibility of inconsistency in application, and thus raises questions about
how best to channel the bureaucrat’s discretion. The public and those
regulated, Professor Strauss argues, would generally prefer a regime
94. Professor Strauss has cautioned that the search for mandatory controls of the
allocation of policymaking between adjudication and rulemaking is illusory in part
because many agencies do not have an effective mechanism for choice. See Strauss, Rules,
Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law, supra note 82, at 1274–75. As a result, he has
disagreed with efforts to mandate this choice, see id. at 1265 (arguing adjudicative
function cannot be limited to fact-ﬁnding and adjudication and inevitably involves policy
choice). Justiﬁcation of policymaking choice is a more minimal demand, though one that
does open the door to judicial second-guessing of agency practices.
95. A commonly used deﬁnition of a guidance document is that appearing in
President Bush’s (now repealed) executive order on guidance. See Exec. Order No.
13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763(3)(g) (2007) (deﬁning guidance document as “agency
statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory action, that
sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a
statutory or regulatory issue”); see also Connor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing
Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 Yale L.J. 782, 785 n.1 (2010) (using this
deﬁnition and noting others’ reliance on same).
96. E.g., Non-Codiﬁed Documents Is the Department of Labor Regulating the Public
Through the Backdoor?: Hearing on H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l. Econ.
Growth, Nat. Res., & Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Gov’t. Reform, 106th Cong.
1–4 (2000) (examining Labor Department’s guidance practices); Robert A. Anthony,
Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 Duke L.J. 1311, 1373 (1992) (arguing agencies
should proceed through notice-and-comment for any rule of general applicability other
than mere interpretations if rule is given effect by agency or establishes mandatory
standards).
97. Strauss, Rulemaking Continuum, supra note 86, at 1482.
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where lower-level bureaucrats are bound to apply instructions issued
publicly in the form of guidance documents, even though those
instructions do not themselves “bind” the public and were not issued
through notice-and-comment.98 In short, published guidance documents
that specify how agencies will exercise their discretion have clarity,
consistency, and publicity beneﬁts to the public and those regulated—
they create a form of internal law that structures the agency’s decisionmaking.99 By educating the public about how the agency intends to act or
its understanding of its powers, such guidance documents also “permit[]
important efficiencies to those who must deal with government.”100 The
notice beneﬁts of published guidance suggest that agencies have an
affirmative obligation to issue guidance documents that provide the
public and the regulated with the agency’s best statement of how the
agency plans to apply its statutory and regulatory sources, especially when
rulemaking is not practicable. In short, the public and regulated would
“prefer having publication rules to not having them,”101 and that
preference is importantly grounded in rule-of-law values.
Recognizing a prima facie obligation to issue guidance is particularly
timely. For years, under the principles of Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n v.
FAA102 and Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,103 an agency
could alter authoritative guidance only through a new notice-andcomment rulemaking. Professor Strauss criticizes this doctrine as a poor
reading of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and because of the
constraint it inserts between the central agency and its ﬁeld ofﬁces;
effectively, it inhibits lower-level ofﬁcials from issuing prospective guidance
by requiring the agency act through rulemaking to undo it.104 In March
2015, the Supreme Court’s decision in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n
overruled Paralyzed Veterans and Alaska Professional Hunters.105 As a result,
agencies no longer face a disincentive to issue and to reevaluate and
update their guidance to ensure that it reﬂects the agency’s best
understanding of the statutory scheme. Perez thus clears the way for
agencies to comply with this rule-of-law obligation to provide a prospective
statement of the agency’s best understanding of the law in guidance when
rulemaking is not practicable.
98. Id. at 1483.
99. See id. (“[T]hese satisﬁed consumers of publication rules tend not to appear in
court . . . .”). See generally Mashaw, supra note 10, at 213, 223–24 (characterizing internal
law within Social Security Administration as providing this form of constraint).
100. Strauss, Rulemaking Continuum, supra note 86, at 1481.
101. Id. at 1480.
102. 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
103. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
104. See Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring
Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 803, 846–47 (2001) (noting
how doctrine has effect of binding superiors to ﬁeld office guidance).
105. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015) (indicating overruling).
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4. Conclusion. — Consideration of how these rule-of-law principles of
notice apply in the administrative context yields one theoretical point and
emphasizes the importance of several other projects. The theoretical point
is that these rule-of-law demands are appropriately applied to law that
binds private parties, and so frequently the law agencies produce, not
agencies’ authorizing statutes. This theoretical point saves the administrative state from the kind of condemnation that results from applying
these values to regulatory legislation. But this point also brings into focus a
sequence of more speciﬁc inquiries. First, it suggests the need for scholars
as well as policymakers to evaluate agency rules and adjudications with
regard to these Fullerian virtues, a project Professor Strauss has initiated.
Second, in view of rulemaking’s general superiority with respect to these
values, this theoretical point suggests an obligation for agencies to justify
their choices when implementing policy outside of rulemaking. Third, it
suggests that when rulemaking is impracticable, agencies have an
obligation to provide guidance conveying their best understanding to the
public of how their statutes and regulations operate.
C.

Justiﬁcation

The demand for justiﬁcation is a central feature of administrative
law and the work of administrative agencies. The difficult question is the
extent to which the proceduralization of these requirements ends up
undermining the aspiration that the agency’s justiﬁcation for its actions
follows from and responds to public participation.
At a formal level, administrative institutions are the paradigm of
reason-giving institutions. Indeed, reason-giving requirements emerged for
administrative agencies before courts imposed them, putting pressure on
courts to fall in line.106 Administrative law has long taken agencies’
reasoned elaboration of grounds for their action as necessary to the
validity of agency action and imposed higher duties of reasoned elaboration on agencies than on other government actors, such as lower courts
or Congress.107 Longstanding principles of administrative law require that
agency action be upheld only on the basis of the grounds upon which the
agency justiﬁed its action, treating reliance on post hoc justiﬁcations as

106. See Dyzenhaus & Taggart, supra note 33, at 145 (showing mandated reason-giving
arose for agencies before courts). We tend to think of argumentation and reasoned decisionmaking as having their historical and conceptual core in common law courts, with
administrative actors coming to reason-giving later in time. Professors David Dyzenhaus
and the late Michael Taggart argue to the contrary: The requirement for reason-giving was
formalized for administrative decisionmakers who in turn “put pressure on judges to bring
themselves into line with the trend toward legally enforceable reasoned elaboration.” Id.
107. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 Yale L.J. 952,
955 (2007) (observing higher reason-giving demands apply in review of agency action than
review of lower court judgments or of legislation).
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exceptional.108 The APA also imposes procedural requirements that
agencies state the reasons for their action, whether they are acting through
notice-and-comment rulemaking,109 formal adjudication,110 or otherwise.111
Part of the way in which administrative law guards against arbitrary agency
action is through these requirements of reason-giving and judicial review
of agency action under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard.112
Whatever the rule of law requires by way of reasoned justiﬁcation appears
to be already part of administrative law and built into the way administrative agencies do business.
These principles of reasoned justiﬁcation have a close connection to
the principles of authorization discussed above. The requirement of
justiﬁcation reinforces the principle of decisional allocation by requiring
reasons, not just action, from the decider. Requiring reasons makes it
more difficult to evade the responsibility for independent judgment;
indeed, developing reasons takes the decider a long way toward
exercising independent judgment. In addition, when reasoned elaboration operates in company with the principle of decisional allocation, it
is clear that the duty to give reasons is not a general requirement of
reasons to be given by government but a requirement of reasons from
the person responsible for the action. When viewed in this light, part of
the problem with a President having the power to legally direct an
agency’s action is that this direction would sever the connection between
the agency’s action and its justiﬁcation. It would result in an agency
action without the agency’s own justiﬁcation. If valid agency action
requires justiﬁcation, then the President must not simply direct the
agency but rather convince the agency official of a particular action in
terms of the official’s own duties under the statute. Within those terms,
the encounter becomes one of persuasion based on reasons, reasons that
the agency official has an independent duty to evaluate.
Reasoned elaboration also underlies the deference—or weight—
given to agencies by courts and others. As Professors Dyzenhaus and
Taggart write, “[T]o require reasons from such [administrative] officials
is to imply that they have an important role in interpreting the law, a role
that judges with others should respect as long as the officials do a decent

108. Id. (providing account of foundation of Chenery I principle that agency action
cannot be upheld unless upon grounds upon which agency acted in exercising its power).
109. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (requiring agency produce “concise general statement”
of basis and purpose of regulations).
110. Id. § 557 (requiring decider to state reasons for decision).
111. Id. § 555(e) (stating brief statement of grounds of denial is necessary and selfexplanatory).
112. Id. § 706(2)(A) (requiring reviewing courts to hold unlawful agency action that is
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law”).
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job of justifying their decisions.”113 Reasoning might be thought of as the
coin by which agencies pay for deference.114
While justiﬁcation may be well reﬂected in administrative law’s
current demands for reasoned elaboration, difﬁcult questions arise with
regard to the connection between justiﬁcation and genuine opportunities
for participation. In principle, the rule-of-law value of argumentation is not
just a demand for the public ofﬁcial or body to provide their own oracular
justiﬁcation, but also to provide a justiﬁcation that is the product of a
participatory process through which stakeholders have an opportunity to
present their positions to the government policymakers. The justiﬁcation is
the culmination of a procedure and participation, not a substitute for it.
But, with regard to agency rulemaking, requiring the justiﬁcation be
informed by participation raises familiar, thorny issues when that
requirement becomes judicially enforceable. On the one hand, judicial
enforcement of an agency’s duty to engage commentators can empower
those within the agency that care most about reasoned justiﬁcation.
“[A]gency ofﬁcials cannot know who their judicial reviewers will be,” as
Professor Strauss writes, so they cannot “bend their science to particular
supposed judicial tastes.”115 As a result, anticipating that there will be a
judicial hard look at their decisions has the effect of endowing “those who
care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever
with which to move those who do not.”116 There are thus strong reasons to
be reluctant to “give that lever up.”117 On the other hand, at least in the
context of rulemaking, when probing judicial review is combined with the
requirement that an agency’s rule not depart signiﬁcantly from its
proposals, the agency will do most substantive vetting of their proposals
with select stakeholders prior to public opportunities to comment.118
113. Dyzenhaus & Taggart, supra note 33, at 165.
114. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 355, 399 (2012)
(noting role of reason-giving as basis for judicial deference to agencies).
115. Strauss, Courts in Administrative Law, supra note 55, at 829.
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J. 38, 60 (1975)).
117. Id.
118. Professor Strauss made this observation about the Department of Interior in
1972, see Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law, supra note 82, at 1252–
53, and now scholars acknowledge this phenomenon as a weakness of rulemaking
practices. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 Duke L.J. 1490, 1492
(1992) (suggesting no administrator turns to notice-and-comment when he or she is
genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested parties). A recent study of ninety
hazardous-air-pollutant standards set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
by Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes, and Lisa Peters provides an illustration. Wendy
Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99 (2011). The study measured the
inﬂuence of industry, consumer groups, and the public in the formulation of the
proposed rules (during the pre-proposal stage) and the impact of their comments on the
ﬁnal rules. With respect to these rules, EPA had on average 178 contacts with interest
groups during the development of the proposal, prior to the publication of the proposed
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Accordingly, a challenge for judicial review of rulemaking is to incentivize
well-documented and justiﬁed decisions while also making the public
process one in which meaningful engagement is possible.
The rule-of-law demand for justiﬁcation thus has two different faces
in the administrative context. On the one hand, if the principle is
concerned with detailed justiﬁcation of the grounds for action, administrative agencies and administrative law are models. On the other hand,
a challenge of justiﬁcation, especially with regard to notice-and-comment
rulemaking, is to ﬁnd a way to combine participation with judicial review
that does not end up contradicting the purposes of public participation.
D. Coherence
Law presents itself as a system in which norms ﬁt together.119 What
does law’s claim to coherence demand of administrative governance? In
view of the American style of statute-making, this demand for coherence
falls on agencies as well as courts, requiring agencies to engage in a
synthetic and integrating form of statutory interpretation.
1. Locus of the Demand for Coherence. — In thinking about this demand
for systemic coherence in a legal system, it matters what type or source of
law predominates. Statutes have long been recognized as a dominant form
of law.120 And in the United States, statutory law has a distinctive character.
It does not take the form of a civil code. A civil code purports to provide an
integrated and comprehensive statement of the governing norms.121 As a
result, the demand for coherence in a country with such a code falls
heavily on the drafters and adopters of the code. In the United States, in
contrast, statutes have less comprehensive ambitions; they offer speciﬁc
directions to speciﬁc problems, and, even within that more limited
domain, they frequently bear clear marks of political bargaining.122
This basic contrast between a civil code and the more responsive, ad
hoc, situational, and overtly political character of legislation in the
United States has clear implications for the legal institutions most
responsible for creating law’s coherence. If systemic coherence is not
rule—more than double the average number of comments received on these rules. See id.
at 124. Industry and industry associations had, on average, 170 times more informal
communications in the pre-proposal stage than public interest groups. See id. at 125.
119. See Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, supra note 14, at 33 (positing
coherence as dimension of rule of law).
120. See, e.g. Strauss, Resegregating, supra note 36, at 442 (noting this fundamental
point).
121. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 235
(1999) [hereinafter Strauss, Common Law and Statutes] (noting civil codes “emerge in a
single legislative act, after exquisite intellectual consideration, as an integrated whole” and
“are rarely if ever amended; and if amended, only after equivalent study and attention to
the integrated effects of change”).
122. See id. at 240 (“[O]ur legislative process is an essentially reactive, pragmatic
process, and not a proactive or rational one.”).
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built into the legislative process and drafting, then it falls to the
institutions with responsibility for interpreting and implementing
statutory law, namely administrative agencies and courts. To the extent
that pursuing and realizing this value of systemic coherence invariably
involves synthesis and constructive judgment, we can expect coherence
to ground a role for statutory implementers that involves bringing a wide
range of judgment to bear, in the mode of a common law court, even
when dealing with statutory materials.
2. The Agency’s Duty of Systemic Coherence. — Professor Strauss provides a
vivid picture of the situation of the agency implementing its statutory
mandate, which describes the agency’s basic duty to do so in a way that
creates coherence.123 The agency, as Professor Strauss explains, faces
distinctive demands to mediate between past and present commitments.
The agency staff frequently plays a role in drafting its own enabling
legislation.124 The agency’s task is delimited and anchored by that statutory
text as well as guided by the set of understandings, forged in part through
its legislative history, which informs “what the statute has ‘always’ been
understood to mean.”125 Yet the agency’s implementation of the statute is
by design responsive to contemporary political overseers. At times, the
views of an agency’s political overseers will overwhelm the agency’s
evolving understanding of the statute and its requirements.126 But even
when that inﬂuence is only supervisory, it is understood to appropriately
and legitimately shape the agency’s approach. As Professor Strauss writes,
“what distinguishes agencies from courts in the business of statute-reading
is that we accept a legitimate role for current politics in the work of
agencies.”127 As a result, the agency’s job is in part to provide as much
coherence as possible between past commitments,128 reﬂected in the
statute and the agency’s past practices, on the one hand, and current
policy preferences on the other. Of course, there are sometimes abrupt
changes in rules, but even then the agency’s job (or duty) is to expose the
coherence of the statutory regime underlying those changes.
This points to a larger respect in which the agency faces a demand
for coherence. As many regulatory statutes are intransitive,129 agencies
123. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with
Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 321, 329–30 (1990) [hereinafter Strauss, Agency Interpretations]
(characterizing this duty).
124. See Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at 1146 (describing
agency involvement in drafting organic statutes).
125. Strauss, Agency Interpretations, supra note 123, at 330.
126. See id. at 331 (noting this eventuality).
127. Id. at 335.
128. Cf. Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory
Interpretation, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 89, 104 (noting agencies are “closer to the legislative
process” and “have a keener sense” of the process’s compromises and limits).
129. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (characterizing administrative
government as involving broad delegations to administrative officials).
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have distinctive lawmaking powers. Faced with a broad range of
judgment, the agency’s “responsibility is to assist in . . . implementation
in a coherent, intelligible way.”130 One might view the duty of coherence
as a necessary feature of tolerating broad delegation. Just as the agency
does not have Congress’s prerogatives of obscurantism,131 the agency also
cannot avoid the duty to implement statutory power in a way that shows
how the statute ﬁts together, creating an integrated set of legal requirements. This coherence is one of the most basic demands judicially
enforced through arbitrary-and-capricious review.
Does this duty of coherence apply only to making sense of the
agency’s particular statutory powers or does it include a broader obligation
to read the statute in light of the legal system as a whole? Professor
Strauss’s rendering of the agency’s obligations to achieve coherence within
its statutory domain has provided a foundation for other scholars to
examine the agency’s broader duties to incorporate constitutional and
background legal norms within its reasoning. As part of the inquiry into
administrative constitutionalism, Professor Gillian Metzger highlights
agencies’ obligation to take constitutional norms seriously when implementing statutes, as well as their institutional competence to do so.132
Professor Kenneth Bamberger also defends agencies’ capacity to take into
account broad background norms, including the constitutional
implications of their decisions.133 This broader duty ﬁts with the
techniques of statutory interpretation developed by Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks.134 Underlying Hart and Sacks’s work is the premise that agencies’
duties as actors within our constitutional scheme require them to read
their statutes in light of underlying constitutional commitments and thus
to seek systemic coherence within our system of government, rather than
mere statutory coherence.
This emphasis on agencies’ duty to take into account the value of
systemic coherence does not provide a complete account of what
coherence involves and could be subject to different speciﬁcations. Some
deﬁne statutory coherence with more emphasis on its textual features
and others with greater emphasis on its policy context. But recognizing
this duty clariﬁes that the demand for coherence should be evaluated
130. Strauss, Deference Is Too Confusing, supra note 53, at 1146.
131. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977)
(“[A]gencies do not have quite the prerogative of obscurantism reserved to legislatures.”).
132. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 13, at 522 (defending
constitutional interpretation as part of agencies’ role and competence).
133. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative
Policymaking, 118 Yale L.J. 64, 96–97 (2008) (defending agencies’ capacity to engage and
incorporate background values).
134. See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies
Interpret Statutes, 109 Nw. L. Rev 871, 911–13 (2015) (arguing agency statutory
interpretation should include Hart and Sacks’s element of integrating statutory obligations
with Constitution and background values).

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE

2015

from the perspective of the individual or ﬁrm that is subject to law’s
obligations. That perspective on the private party anchors legal development within a set of social expectations and political judgments. This
perspective also provides a foundation for the agency to incorporate its
understanding of the Constitution among the considerations that bear
on statutory implementation. In sum, given the limited integral aspirations of legislation in the United States, agencies have a particular
responsibility, grounded in the rule-of-law value of coherence, to
implement their statutory scheme in a way that makes it intelligible in
light of their statutory powers, surrounding statutory law, as well as
constitutional and background legal values.
E.

Procedural Fairness

The rule of law does not require or endorse any particular model of
division or balance of governmental powers. It is consistent with parliamentary government and presidential systems that divide election of the
executive and legislature. But it does make demands on the structure of
agency adjudications. At a most basic level, the rule-of-law value of procedural fairness requires an impartial decider in adjudications.135 This basic
demand has implications for the organization of administrative adjudication. In particular, it suggests separation of personnel; those who
investigate and prosecute should not also decide. The principle of separation of persons—and in particular the separation of enforcement staff
from those who decide—is enforced by the APA, though not completely.136
Impartiality (and its appearance) is also threatened when an adjudicator faces the prospect of removal based on the merits of his or her
decisions. This suggests a rule-of-law foundation for removal protections
for adjudicators. This protection is clearly evident in the Supreme Court’s
tolerance for—and even implication of—removal protections for those
135. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S.
602, 617 (1993) (plurality opinion) (“[D]ue process requires a ‘neutral and detached
judge in the ﬁrst instance . . . .’” (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62
(1972))); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding one component
of due process is opportunity to rebut factual assertions before neutral decisionmaker).
136. The APA requires separation of the agency’s adversarial enforcement staff from
its adjudicative decisionmakers as a matter of personnel, oversight, and communications.
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012) (providing employees engaged in adversarial investigation or
prosecution may not “participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or
agency review . . . except as witness or counsel in public proceedings”); id. § 554(d)(1)
(stating hearing officers “may not consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on
notice and opportunity for all parties to participate”). Section 554(d) also includes a
“command inﬂuence rule,” which prohibits agency adjudicators from being “responsible
to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee [who] engage[s] . . . in
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.” Id. § 554(d)(2). But the APA does
not mandate this separation for agency heads, who may hear appeals from initial
adjudicators and are generally vested with the powers of initial decisionmakers. See id.
§ 554(d)(2)(C) (“This subsection does not apply . . . to the agency or a member or
members of the body comprising the agency.”).
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agency ofﬁcials who adjudicate. As Professor Strauss explains, upholding of
removal protections for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States137 is explicable as a grant of removal protections for a
body engaged in adjudicative, quasi-judicial tasks.138
The principle that adjudicative decisionmaking powers justify goodcause removal protections ﬁnds further support in Wiener v. United States.139
Even though the statute at issue in Wiener was silent as to removal
protections,140 the Court held that the President lacked authority to
remove a member of the War Claims Commission without cause. The
Court emphasized that the Commission’s task was “adjudicat[ion]
according to law,” which involved reaching decisions “on the merits of
each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal considerations, by
a body that was ‘entirely free from . . . control or coercive inﬂuence, direct
or indirect.’”141
137. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
138. See Strauss, The Place of Agencies, supra note 9, at 613–16 (“The Court [in
Humphrey’s Executor] was acutely conscious, however, of the extent to which the
Commission acted in circumstances calling for judicial impartiality and the removal from
politics that might tend to protect it.”); see also Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces:
Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State 425 (2006) (noting FTC’s
adjudicative functions provide ground for upholding agency’s removal protections).
139. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). Recent scholarship has explored internal separation of powers
in agencies. See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L.J. 2314, 2316–17 (2006) (lamenting
“paucity of thought” regarding nature of checks on executive branch and identifying
bureaucratic agencies as “critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers [in
the executive branch]”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process Cure Substance? A Response to
Neal Katyal’s “Internal Separation of Powers,” 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 125 (2006),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/can-process-cure-substance-a-response-to-neal-katyala8217sa8220internal-separation-of-powersa8221 [http://perma.cc/7BBD-8DDL] (insisting “[w]e
already have an internally divided executive . . . characterized by bureaucratic overlap,
independent agencies, and perennial complaints by Presidents about their inability to
control the bureaucracy”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 436 (2009) (discussing
constitutionality of “vast majority of internal separation of powers mechanisms within the
Executive Branch”). Long before the rise of interest in the “internal separation of powers” in
agencies, Professor Strauss identiﬁed separation of functions as a distinctive strain of
separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Whereas traditional separation-of-powers models are
concerned with the allocation of government institutions among the branches and the
implications that follow from those placement decisions, separation of functions is
concerned, for instance, with asking about “what combinations of functions or impacts of
external inﬂuence will interfere with fair resolution of a particular proceeding.” Strauss, The
Place of Agencies, supra note 9, at 622.
140. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350.
141. Id. at 355–56 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629). Further highlighting the
grounds for protecting adjudicators from at-will removal, the Wiener Court emphasized that
Humphrey’s Executor had “explicitly ‘disapproved’ the expressions in Myers [v. United States]
supporting the President’s inherent constitutional power to remove members of quasijudicial bodies.” Id. at 352 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 626–27). The Court in Myers
distinguished quasi-judicial powers but made clear that even when engaging in adjudication,
decisions not to the liking of the President would still be grounds for subsequent removal.
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While it is possible to read the Supreme Court’s most recent removal
decision as weakening the principle that adjudicative tasks are a sufﬁcient
justiﬁcation for removal protection,142 the principle is still solidly entrenched and reﬂects a core element of the rule of law, namely that the
impartiality of adjudication is enhanced when the adjudicator does not act
under “the Damocles’ sword of removal by the President”143 based on the
content of their decisions. And indeed, today most initial adjudicators
within administrative agencies are administrative law judges who enjoy
good-cause protection from removal.144 That structural protection is an
element of the demands of the rule of law on internal agency
organization—and provides reasons to guard against further weakening of
removal protections for adjudicators.
F.

Summary

Evaluating administrative law through the lens of these ﬁve dimensions of the rule of law exposes some long-established practices as having
troublesome rule-of-law foundations and reveals that other contested
practices are well grounded in rule-of-law values. The closest match
between the rule-of-law principles and current doctrine and practice is
justiﬁcation; administrative law and practice represents as well as any
domain of law the sense in which law is ultimately argumentative.
The idea that agencies have duties to assist in integrating statutory
law into the larger fabric of law, and thus to be partners with courts in
implementing the law in a coherent fashion, while not as well-established
as the agency’s duties of reasoned elaboration, is steadily gaining recognition. This analysis highlights the rule-of-law foundation for that duty.
With respect to notice principles, more groundbreaking work is
required. Some of it will take the form of holding agencies to the basic
principles of notice, as current scholarship has done with regard to the
See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117–18, 134 (1926) (stating power to appoint and
remove executive subordinates is “certainly . . . not . . . legislative or judicial” and that
“moment [President] loses conﬁdence in the intelligence, ability, judgment or loyalty of any
one of them, he must have the power to remove him without delay”). While the President
may be restricted from removing an ofﬁcial discharging quasi-judicial functions in the midst
of a particular case, the Myers Court wrote, the President “may consider the decision after its
rendition as a reason for removing the ofﬁcer, on the ground that the discretion regularly
entrusted to that ofﬁcer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely
exercised.” Id. at 135.
142. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 Cardozo L. Rev.
2391, 2409–10 (2011) (noting PCAOB exercised adjudicative task and so adjudication
alone was not viewed as sufficient basis for removal protection).
143. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356.
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (noting actions against administrative law judges may
only be taken for good cause). Removal of administration law judges is vested in the Merit
Systems Protection Board, whose members are themselves protected from removal from
office by a good-cause provision. See id. § 1202(d) (“Any member may be removed by the
President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
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fundamental value of publicity in agency rules. Further work could also form
an executive or judicial requirement for agencies to justify their decision
when they opt not to proceed through rulemaking, a departure from longsettled law. It could also usefully involve embracing or even imposing a duty
upon agencies to issue, in the form of guidance, their best general statement
of the law’s requirements when rulemaking is not practicable.
Perhaps the most controversial analysis pertains to the principle of
authorization. Both principles—decisional allocation within the executive
branch and courts giving weight to agencies’ views of the scope of their
own authority—have waxed and waned in terms of their embrace in the
law. Today these positions, at least based on intimations from the Supreme
Court, may be on the wane. If so, there is all the more reason to highlight
the ways in which ofﬁcials conceive of their statutory obligations as
personal anchors and reinforces the government’s commitment to the law.
And once so conceived, the grounds for recognizing that independent
review—whether for agency ofﬁcials or courts—does not require eschewing respectful consideration of the positions of other government
ofﬁcials become all the stronger.
CONCLUSION
Law provides beneﬁts to society but also poses risks. Some view those
risks as ampliﬁed when courts or administrative agencies conceive their
roles too broadly. Professor Strauss views those risks as ampliﬁed when
courts and agencies conceive their roles too narrowly. This assessment is
not fundamentally grounded in an expansive view of the size of the state,
but rather in the scope of law’s demands on judicial and administrative
agents. For Professor Strauss, agencies and courts have arduous duties.
They are tasked with making sense of the issue before them while
resolving it in a way that integrates it into the larger fabric of law; this
frequently requires considering the intelligibility of statutory law, its
relationship to other law, and the current context. The exercise of that
duty also requires justiﬁcation and engagement with those affected.
Because the duties of government are personal, they create a system of
accountability—accountability through the repeated reliance on
individual judgment. Recognizing duties of that wide scope may be part
of what enables a society to accommodate change without abandoning its
best structure.145

145. See Strauss, Common Law and Statutes, supra note 121, at 255 (second alteration
added) (“[W]hat we mean by law . . . [is] [t]he process by which a society accommodates
to change without abandoning its fundamental structure.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 14 (1977))).

